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INTRODUCTION
In running the company operations, oftenly the actions of  the managers, instead of  maximizing the welfare
of  the owners (stockholders) as the main purpose of  the company exists or is established, but rather tend
to increase their own welfare. The decisions they make tend to benefit the insiders, for example expanding
to improve the status and salary, as well as imposing costs on companies. These conditions will result in the
emergence of  a wide degree of  difference of  interests between stockholders and the insider. The conflict
caused by the separation between ownership and control functions in financial theory called agency conflict.
Agency theory suggests a number of  mechanisms that can be used to oversee the agency conflict,
including an increase in insider ownership and debt financing. Jensen and Meckling (1976) says that the use
of  instruments of  insider ownership is able to align the interests of  managers and other stockholders, this
policy led to increased managerial control of  the parties. Meanwhile, according to Grossman and Hart
(1982), agency problems can be reduced by using debt policy instruments, the use of  this instrument
would be binding on the company in a “contract” with debtholders, the company burdened with the
obligation to make interest payments and principal repayments on a periodic basis.
The increased percentage of  insider would increase the risk of  non-diversifiable debt (Friend, et al.
1988; Bathala, et al. 1994). They say that a high percentage of  insider would be pushed to choose risky
projects in the hope to gain higher profits. To finance the project, insider choose financing through debt, in
the hope they can divert the underwriting risk to the creditor if  the project fails. On the other hand, if  the
investment project is successful, stockholders will receive the results of  the residue because creditors will
only be paid for certain, namely in the form of  flowers. However, the use of  debt is too high which can
increase the risk of  bankruptcy (Banckruptcy risk) and financial difficulties (financial distress).
In order to overcome the disadvantages of  the emergence of  the use of  debt and the percentage of
too large insider, it takes a control of  mechanism (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Agrawal and Mandelker, 1990).
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Furthermore, according to them, one of  the oversight mechanisms that can be used is to enable the
monitoring through the involvement of  institutional investors. Through these institutional investors, it will
encourage the emergence of  a more optimal monitoring of  the performance of  managers.
Ownership Structure of  Companies in Indonesia
When it is compared with the number of  capital markets in developed countries, which are generally
empirical studies of  the agency theory has been done, the ownership structure of  companies in Indonesia
is very unique. In a number of  capital markets of  developed countries, such as in the United States and
some European countries, the separation of  ownership and control are usual thing that is carried out by a
body which has the power strong enough independence. In general, companies listed in the Indonesia
Stock Exchange, has obstacles or surveillance of  individuals, especially companies owned by Indonesian
citizens descent, it certainly will affect the decisions taken by the management that no longer reflect purely
the interests of  shareholders more. Theoretically it means that the interests of  management and shareholders
would be relatively consistent. Therefore, it is not surprising that many members of  the family who has a
large enough percentage of  shareholding often have key positions in the company.
Supervision of  the company’s ownership in most companies that have been traded in the capital
market, not undergone many changes since those shares are offered first time (initial public offerings),
generally family members have dominant shareholding. Furthermore, there are also a number of  shares
held by institutions as part of  monitoring the implementation course of  the comp any, generally these
institutions are affiliated with the company, so that left only few stocks that actually owned by the public.
Uniqueness in implementation monitoring and ownership structure of  the company will have an influence
on the policies of  the company. The high enough levels of  insider ownership will facilitate the supervision
and also align the interests of  managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), therefore it will be
able to reduce the agency conflict of  equity, but on the other side the conflict will worsen the debt agency.
Nevertheless it is not clear how the company’s ownership structure and management relating to “corporate
leverage” in an agency theory perspective.
Based on a number of  studies that have been done before, notably by Bathala, et. al. (1994) and
Sihombing (2000), this study aims to explain how the effect of  institutionally ownership of  the debt policy
and insider within an agency theory perspective.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Agency Theory
Agency relationship arises when one or more individuals or owners pay individual or agency to act on its
name, then they delegate their rights and authority to make such decisions to the agencies they have
appointed (Brigham, 1996). Meanwhile, according to Harianto and Sudomo (1998), quoted by Sihombing
(2000), agency theory explains the relationship between the employer and the recipient of  the mandate to
carry out the work. The employer called the principal will give the right and authority to others who called
the agent to exercise this right. Both sides are bound by a contract stipulating the rights and obligations of
each. Meanwhile, Fama (1980) in his classic theory says that the separation of  ownership and control over
a security perspective into a set of  agreements between the agent and the principal is an efficient form of
organization. The statement emphasizes the importance of  this agency relationship.
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The agency problem between shareholders and managers or the controlling party and the minority
stockholders, potentially arise if  managers’ control of  those shares is less than 100%. This occurs because
not all the benefits will be enjoyed by the manager, so they do not concentrate on maximizing the interests
of  the owner of  the company. Jensen and Meckling (1976) say that the condition is as a consequence of  the
separation of  management and ownership functions (the separation of  the decision making and risk beating
functions of  the firm). The decision makers relatively risk for decision-making mistakes, so the risk is
borne by the stockholders entirely. As a result, management tends to expenditures consumptive and counter-
productive to its own interests, such as an increase in salary and status. One oversight mechanism to do is
to activate the monitoring through ownership of  shares by institutional (institutional ownership), so that
the agency conflict that can occur reduced.
Supervisory Mechanisms to Reduce Conflicts
Problems agency has the potential to emerge as the company grows, these problems also as a consequence
of  the separation of  the functions of  decision-making and underwriting risk. In these conditions, managers
have a tendency to do various expenditures for unproductive investments in excess. This occurs because of
the relatively similar risk borne, conflict arising from disparities is known as equity interests of  agency
conflict. To minimize such conflict of  interest, it would require an oversight mechanism to align between
the two interests.
Bathala, et al. (1994) in an empirical study said that the distribution of financial claims and institutional
ownership is an important supervisory agent and able to make a consistent active role in protecting the
interests of  its investment in the company. They say that there is a relationship that is substitutability
between debt policy and institutional ownership; they argue that an increase in the proportion of  institutional
ownership can replace the need for debt so as to reduce the debt agency conflict. Therefore, they cite an
expected negative causal relationship between debt policy and the proportion of  institutional ownership.
The findings are consistent with the results of  empirical research by McConnell and Servaes (1990), as
cited by Welberforce (2000), which states that there is a fact that there is a positive supervisory role carried
out by institutional investors. The findings are reinforced by a study of  Chen and Steiner (1999) which says
that the presence of  institutional investors is expected to be able to reduce the concentration of  stock
ownership by insider. Wilberforce (2000) conducted a study to test whether a financial policy may be
substituted with non-financial policy (insider ownership) in dealing with the agency. By using a simultaneous
equations analysis of  the cross-sectional data, research results show that in addressing the agency conflict,
the use of  debt will trigger a new agency conflict between creditors and stockholders.
Research Hypothesis Formulation
The relationship between debt policy and institutional ownership can be described as a relationship that is
monitoring-substitution effect. The fact is supported by the results of  empirical study of  Bathala, et al.
(1994), which argues that the presence of  institutional ownership can replace the debt to reduce the agency
conflict. Furthermore, they say that there is a negative relationship between institutional ownership and
debt policy. A similar opinion is expressed by Moh’d, et al. (1998) who also finds a significant negative
relationship between institutional ownership with debt ratios. Based on these results, the hypothesis can be
formulated as follows:
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H1: institutional ownership negative effect on the debt ratio.
H2: institutional ownership negative effect on insider ownership.
The control variables used in this study are based on some previous studies (Bathal, et. al. 1994;
Sihombing 2000). The variable functions to see if  the number of  control variables entered into the model,
the main independent variable, namely the institutional ownership is significantly stronger, so as to reduce
the error term. In this study, which is used as a control variable as follows: for the first equation (dr-equation);
insider ownership, growth, earnings volatility, size and profit. Meanwhile for the second equation (insider -
equation); growth, volatility of  the stock, size and debt ratio.
 RESEARCH METHOD
This study uses secondary data, where the study population consisted of  manufacturing companies listed
on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) during the years 2010 to 2014. In this study, data were collected
using purposive sampling method, which is a member-based sample collection methods a certain criterion.
In this study, several variables are used in order to confirm the two forms of  simultaneous equations
(simultaneous-equation) which would then be used to test the hypothesis that has been described in previous
chapters. From the development of  hypotheses and research model schematic framework, it can be
formulated into two simultaneous equations, the ratio of  debt (debt ratio equation) and insiders (insider
equation) as the dependent variable. In this study, the debt ratio will serve as regressors in the equation
insiders, but on the other hand variable insiders will actually function as regressors in the equation debt
ratio. So in other words, the two variables (dr and insider) have the nature of  jointly determined endogenous
variables, while the main independent variable (primary variable interest)
Figure 1: Research Framework
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dr = a01 + a11Insider + a12Instl + a13Growth + a14Earnvolt + a15Size + a16Profit + e1Insider= a02 + a21dr + a22Instl + a23Growth + a24Stockvolt + a25Size + �1
Keterangan:
dr = Debt ratio
Insider = Insiders ownership
Instl = Institutional ownership
Earnvolt = Earning volatility
�1 dan �2 = Error term 1 don 2
a01 dam a02 = Konstanta
Growth = Growth
Size = Size
Stockvolt = Stock volatility
Profit = Profitability
a11 s.d. a16; a021 s.d. a25 = Regression coeffecient
To find out more precisely about the relationship between the two equations above, the depiction of
the research model will be able to explain the simultaneity of  the relationship between these two structural
equations. Therefore, the program for the first equation (debt ratio - simultaneous equation), variable
growth, size earnvolt, and profit function as a control variable, while for the second equation (insider-
simultaneous equation) variable growth, size stockvolt, serve as control variables. So it can be said that the
model can give an idea of  how insiders effect on the debt ratio and how debt ratio also affects the insiders.
Mathematically, the equation is able to accommodate and answer the formulation of  research problems.
On the other hand, to process the data obtained helped by using Analysis Moment Structure (AMOS)
program.
Model Hypothesis Testing
To test the hypothesis of  the study, as mentioned previously, the most appropriate method to be used is a
method of  structural equation modeling or latent variable analysis or analysis LISREL. The proposed
model is considered fitted, if  they meet several criteria, namely:
(a) Non-significant Chi Square (at least > 0.05, preferably > 0100 or > 0.2000).
(b) Incremental fit (Goodness of  Fit Index (GFI), Adjusted GFI (AGFI), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI),
normed Fit Index (NFI) and CFI) indicates a value greater than 0.90.
(c) RMR value (Root Means Square Residual) and RMSEA low (often close to zero).
(d) Has a positive value Degree of  Freedom (DF).
(e) The ratio of  the chi-square and df  (FMIN/DF) are small or very close to 1 (one).
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(f) The model has a stability index is low (< 1), smaller means more fitted models arranged. The
significance of  the effect of  each independent variable and the value.
The coefficient estimate can be seen in each column and the estimated value of  C.R (Critical Ratio)
which can be seen from the results output AMOS (Regression Weight). In this study, the first hypothesis
could be accepted if  the institutional variable coefficients have a negative and significant value to variable
rate debt, the opposite situation means that the first hypothesis is rejected. While the second hypothesis is
also acceptable if  institutional ownership variable has a negative and significant coefficient on the variable
insider, the opposite situation means the hypothesis is rejected.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
From the 104 pieces of  companies sample that have met the study criteria, it is obtained a description
descriptive statistics that can serve to know the characteristics of  the samples used in the study. Descriptive
statistical data presented includes: names of  variables in the study, the number of  valid samples, data
interval, maximum and minimum values, and the arithmetic average standards or standards deviation. The
following table shows further
Table 1
Descriptive Statistic
Variable N Min Max Mean Std. Deviation
Insider 104 0.00380 0.58470 0.1445317 0.1233527
Institutional ownership 104 0.12970 0.93650 0.5499452 0.2032720
Debt ratio 104 0.00020 0.48640 0.1336474 0.1250571
Stock volt 104 0.00260 0.39146 0.1266179 0.0731147
Earning volt 104 0.00668 0.26454 0.0354000 0.0269484
Size 104 4.01510 6.63491 5.3606302a 0.5492902
Growth 104 –0.25001 3.05283 0.3640677 0.4942052
Profit 104 –0.04678 0.24571 0.0855000 0.0535480
Source: Processed data
From Table 1 above, the average variable insider ownership of  14.45% of  the 104 samples collected
from the company to the JSE during the observation period. Figures percentage is much greater than the
average of  insider ownership in the companies listed on the stock markets of  developed countries (developed
capital markets) at 8:39% (Chen and Steiner, 1999). Meanwhile, the standard deviation value of  this variable
is large enough 12:51%; this suggests insider ownership at companies sample is very diverse. Variable
institutional ownership has an average of  54.99% with a standard deviation of  20:33%, this value is higher
compared to the same variable in the case of  markets in developed countries. However, in the case of
Indonesia it is clear percentage of  institutional ownership is far greater than insider ownership. Variable
debt (debt ratio) has an average value of  13:36% with a standard deviation of  12:51%. The value of  the
debt ratio in this study is smaller than the results of  the study of  Wilberforce (2000) which is equal to
34.65%. While the average value of  stock volatility is 12.66%, this value is close to the results of  research
Bathala, et al. (1994).
447 International Journal of Applied Business and Economic Research
Financial and Non-Financial Policies:  An Examining  of Agency Theory
Variable earnings volatility has an average value of  3:54% with a standard deviation of  2.69%. Sizeable
deviation rate shows higher differences among the sample of  firms from the average value. Meanwhile
variable sized companies have an average of  5:36 in a logarithmic scale with a standard deviation of  0.549.
This small deviation value indicates that the size of  the sample companies do not have much of  a difference.
Profitability variables have an average of  8:55% with a standard deviation of  5:35%. And last variable rate
has an average growth of  36.41% with a standard deviation of  49.42%, the standard deviation indicates the
magnitude of  the company’s growth rate in the manufacturing industry is very diverse.
Table 2
Model Test Results
Goodness of Fit Level of  fit Results
Absolute fit
�2 Non-significant chi-square (at least p > 0.05, 2.201(level significant Models can be accepted
it is better if p > 0.20). = 0.33) (fitted).
GFI A higher value indicates a more fit GFI = 0.995. Good
[Range between 0-1].
RMSEA Value is said to be fit when < = 0:08. RMSEA = 0.031 Model fit
RMR The lower the better RMR = 0.006 Model fit
Incremental Fit
TLI Model fit, with TLI recommended value > = 0.9. TLI = 0.986 Model fit
A higher value means more fit models.
AGFI A higher value means more models fit AGFI = 0.916 Model fit
RFI RFI = 0.869 Model fit
Parsimonious
PGFI GFI is respesifikasi, use it if there is a comparison. PGFI = 0.055
AIC There needs to be a comparison, positive values AIC = 70.201
lower the better.
From the measurement results goodness of  fit, it can be said that the research model has a value of
fitting the model is good, is simply the result can also be seen from the measurement probability
non-significant of  his (p) of  0.333 (> 0.05, the minimum levels to be able to use the model). It can be
concluded that the research model can be used.
Here are presented the results of  the analysis equation debt ratio and insider ownership with the help
of  Analysis Moment Structure (AMOS) program for the second joint equation, as follows:
Equation Debt Ratio (Debt Ratio - Structural Equation)
Institutional ownership variable has significant negative relationship to the debt ratio; the direction of
this coefficient has been consistent with the predictions of  researchers. This suggests that the presence
of  this variable can replace debt in reducing the agency problem. Variable insider that has a positive
coefficient is not significant, this result is different from the prediction research, it indicates that the
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Table 3
Analysis of  Simultaneous Equation Debt ratio and Insider
Endogen: Debt Ratio (Y1 )
Eksogen Prediction Coefficient Critical ratio
Insider (–)  0.122000  0.92600
Instl (–) – 0.220000** – 2.15400
Growth (–), (+)  0.010000  0.97300
Size (+)  0.086000***  5.85400
Earn (–) – 2.126000*** – 7.60500
Profit (–) – 0.193000 – 1.22300
R2 = 0.475; �2 = 2.201; DF = 2; � = 0.333
Endogen: Insider Ownership (Y2 )
Eksogen Prediction Coefficient Critical ratio
Dr (–) – 0.15300 – 1.10600
Instl (–) – 0.45800*** – 7.15600
Growth (+)  0.03100  1.14600
Size (–) – 0.00200 – 0.09400
Stock (–), (+)  0.07100***  5.27400
R2 = 0.538 * � = 0.10
�2 = 2.201 ** � = 0.05
DF = 2 *** � = 0.01
� = 0.333
direction of  movement between the insider and the debt ratio. Meanwhile, the growth variable that has
a positive coefficient is not significant, indicating if  the company demonstrates the potential of
encouraging developments, the equity financing is the last source of  funding. Variable size has estimated
coefficient significantly positive, it indicates that the bigger the company the more likely the use of  debt
becomes higher.
 Variable earnings volatility has a negative value of  the significant estimated coefficient; it shows that
the higher earnings volatility will increase the risk of  bankruptcy, so companies tend to choose low debt
ratios. Recently, variable profitability has negative value of  not significant estimated coefficient. All variables
have a coefficient corresponds to the direction predicted, unless the insider ownership variables.
Equation Insider Structural Ownership (Insider - Structural Equation)
Institutional ownership variable has a negative correlation significantly against insider ownership, direction
coefficient is consistent with the predictions of  researchers, so that it can be said that the presence of
institutional ownership is able to reduce the concentration of  insider ownership. Institutional investors are
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very concerned to secure a significant investment in the company so that the supervisory role they are
doing could reduce opportunistic behavior of  managers in running the company.
Variable rate debt has a negative coefficient; it means the use of  instruments of  debt policy associated
with the structure of  insider ownership is lower but the results of  the analysis of  these variables shows no
statistically significant. Growth variable have positive estimated coefficients, it means that the insider benefited
informational so that when companies show exciting development potential, it will increase the proportion
of  insider ownership, but the results of  the regression analysis is not statistically significant. Variable size
has a negative not significant estimated coefficient; the last variable stock volatility has a positive value of
the statistically significant estimated coefficients. This suggests that when the company’s performance is
hard monitored from the outside, it results an increase in equity agency conflict. As a consequence, the
owners prefer to oversee the performance of  the company from within, so that the percentage of  insider
increases.
DISCUSSION
Debt-Ratio Equation
From the test results, the debt-ratio equation above shows that institutional ownership variable has a negative
coefficient of  0.220 with a critical ratio of  –2154, where the level negligent 0.05, the value of  critical ratio
is -1.98; this means institutional ownership variable is statistically significant at alpha of  level 5%. From the
test results of  simultaneous equations debt ratios above, it can be concluded that the first hypothesis which
says that institutional ownership affect the debt policy acceptable to the alpha level of  5%. The results of
the analysis of  these variables can be interpreted that institutional ownership is able to contribute positively
in reducing the increasing ratio of  corporate debt, therefore the presence of  institutional ownership is able
to act became effective supervision agency (effectively monitoring agents) to reduce the agency conflict
posed by the debt.
Tests showed that the debt ratio equation variable results insider has a positive coefficient of  0.122
with a critical ratio value of  0.926. The value of  the critical ratio at the alpha level of  10% indicates a figure
of  1,658; this means that the variable is not significant insider. Therefore, these results cannot be generalized
to the case of  manufacturing companies listed in Jakarta Stock Exchange as a member of  the research
sample. The results of  this study are consistent with the results of  empirical studies of  Brailsford, et al
(2000) and Mehran, et al (1999). Variable growth has a positive coefficient (0.010), where this variable has
a value of  the critical ratio for 0973, the value of  the critical ratio at the level of  negligent 10% showed a
value of  1658, so we can say this is not a significant variable. The results of  the analysis of  this variable
cannot be generalized to the manufacturing firms in Jakarta Stock Exchange which became members of
the sample in this study. Variable firm size describes the size of  the company, in this study size has a
coefficient signs of  positive 0086, where this variable has a value of  the critical ratio of  5,854, the value
critical ratio at the level of  alpha 1% by 2617; this means that the variable size are statistically significant at
level of  negligent of  1%. The implications of  the results of  the analysis of  variable size that is, if  the
variable size increases, the tendency of  the debt ratio in the case of  manufacturing companies listed in
Indonesia Stock Exchange will also show an increase.
Based on the test results, it indicates that the debt ratio equation variable earnings volatility has a
negative coefficient of  2.2126, with a critical ratio value of  –7605. The value of  the critical ratio at the
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alpha level of  1% showed the number of  –2617. It can be concluded that the earnings volatility variables
are statistically significant at alpha level of  1%. It could be argued that, if  the standard deviation of  earnings
before interest and taxes are rising, the creditors will not provide loans to the company, so that the debt
ratio will decline. This indicates that the variable earnings volatility to be one of  the crucial considerations
for parties lenders to make loans to the company, due to high volatility will lead to financial difficulties
(financial distress) and eventually increase the cost of  bankruptcy (bankruptcy cost).
Based on the test results of  the first structural equation, it indicates that the variable profitability has
a negative coefficient of  0193, where this variable has a value of  –1 223 critical ratio. By using the alpha
level of  10% of  the obtained value of  the critical ratio amounted to –1658, so we can say that this variable
was not statistically significant. Therefore, the results of  the analysis of  this variable cannot be generalized
to the manufacturing companies listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange as members of  the sample in this
study.
Insider Ownership Equation
From the test results of  insider equation, it shows that institutional ownership variable has a negative
coefficient of  0458. This variable has a value of  –7156 critical ratio, using alpha level of  1%, the value of
the critical ratio of  -2617. So it can be said that institutional ownership variable is statistically significant at
1% negligent level. From the analysis and testing above, it can be concluded that the second hypothesis in
this study is acceptable, i.e. institutional ownership significantly negative effect on negligent insider level at
1%. The implications of  the results of  the analysis of  these variables is the presence of  institutional
investors in an industrial manufacturing company listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange had a significant
effect in controlling the increasing proportion of  insider ownership.
The test results show that the variable equation insider debt ratio (dr) has a negative coefficient value
by 0153, with a value of  –1 106 cr. using the alpha level of  10% was obtained at –1658 cr value, so it can
be said that the variable was not statistically significant dr. With no significant results of  the analysis of  this
variable, then it cannot be generalized to the manufacturing companies listed on the Stock Exchange as
members of  the sample in this study.
Based on test results of  insider ownership equation, it shows that the growth variable has a positive
coefficient of  0.031 with cr value by 1146. By using the alpha level of  10% was obtained values cr by 1658,
so it can be said that the growth was not a significant variable. A relationship that is positive indicates that
when companies show potential developments in the future, then the manager is willing to increase the
proportion of  its stake in the company. However, with no significant growth variables in this study, resulting
in the analysis results cannot be generalized to the manufacturing companies listed on the Stock Exchange
as a member of  the research sample.
Based on the results of  testing against insider ownership equation, it is suggested that the size variable
has a value of  -0002 coefficient, with a value of  –0094 cr. At the alpha level of  10%, it was obtained critical
value of  -1658, so we can say this variable was not statistically significant. The direction of  negative coefficient
on insider equation shows that when managers are able to control the company, they will increase the
proportion of  ownership. In other words, in smaller companies the proportion of  insider ownership is
greater than in much larger companies.
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Variable volatility has a positive coefficient of  0071 with the critical value of  5,274. In the alpha level
of  1%, it was obtained cr by 2617, so it can be said that the volatility of  the stock variables are statistically
significant at alpha level of  1%. This indicates that the variable stock-volt is one important factor to
consider in determining the policy of  non-financial (insider-ownership) which aims to minimize the possibility
of  agency conflicts that occur in manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange as
members of  the sample in this research.
CONCLUSION
Based on the analysis and discussion, it can be drawn some conclusions:
1. Considering the two endogenous variables that have jointly determined the nature of  endogenous
variables, the SEM method is more appropriate than the method of  OLS. Simultaneous testing
of  both structural equation (debt ratio-equation and insider equation) using the method of  SEM
showed that all independent variables used in this study represents a proxy for agency costs so
that it can be used as an instrument decider against debt policy and insider ownership in minimizing
conflicts agency of  company. This can be seen with Goodness of  fit index value greater than 9
(the recommended value), the model produces df  positive and very low residual value. SEM
analysis of  output showed that only 47.50% the changes that occur in the debt ratio (dependent
variable) can be explained or influenced by independent variables in this study model. From the
value of  R-square of  both equations, it is clear that there are many other variables outside the
model of  this study are worth considering and influential in determining whether a financial
policy (debt policy) as well as a policy of  non-finance (insider ownership) in minimizing the
agency conflict.
2. Tests on the first hypothesis shows that institutional ownership variable has a negative relationship
and statistically significant 0.220 (c.r = –2154) in the alpha level of  5%. These results indicate
that the presence of  institutional investors in the companies that the research sample can be
used as a mechanism to minimize conflicts posed by the debt agency. The results of  this study
are consistent with previous studies that found an increase in institutional ownership can replace
the role of  debt in minimizing the agency conflict. So therefore, this result is able to prove that
the first hypothesis which says that institutional ownership affects the debt ratio can be received
at the alpha level of  5%. Meanwhile some of  the control variables in the first equation show the
following results: insider ownership variables have a positive not significant relationship. This
shows that when a significant proportion of  insider ownership, they were reluctant to fund the
company through equity financing. This is because of  the fear of  losing control over the company,
so they prefer to meet the needs of  funds through debt financing. Variable growth has no
significant positive relationship to the debt ratio. While the variable size also has a positive
coefficient in accordance with the direction predicted 0.010 and significant (cr = 5,854) at the
level of  1% negligent. Thus the ratio of  corporate debt tends to increase along with the scale of
the company. Variable earnings volatility has a negative coefficient of  2.126 in accordance with
the predicted and significant (c.r. = –7605) in alpha level of  1%. Profit last variable has a value
and no significant negative coefficient. This means by regard to the outcome of  SEM analysis on
variable earnings volatility, size, it is significant enough to be considered important in determining
the debt policy unlisted company manufacturing company on the JSE in addition to the influence
of  the main variables of  institutional ownership.
International Journal of Applied Business and Economic Research 452
Jaja Suteja
3. The test results of  both hypotheses suggests that institutional ownership variable has a negative
relationship 0458 significantly (cr = –7156) at the level negligent of  1%. These results indicate
that the presence of  institutional ownership in companies as the samples of  this study can be
used as an effective oversight mechanisms to minimize the agency conflict equity. The results of
this study are consistent with previous studies that found an increase in institutional ownership
can replace the role of  insider in minimizing the agency conflict. Thus these results prove that
the second hypothesis which says that the institutional ownership of  insider ownership can be
accepted at a rate of  1% negligent. Meanwhile, several variables are used as controls in the
second equation shows the following results: debt ratio variables have a causal negative not
significant relationship 0153 (cr = –1106). Variable growth has a positive coefficient value of
0.031 but not significant. Meanwhile, the size variable has a negative not significant coefficient
of  0.0020. Recently, variable volatility of  the stock that has a direction 0071 is significantly
positive coefficient (cr = 5,274). This means that if  volatility increases, then the manager will
increase the proportion to the company, this is done in order to improve supervision on the
performance of  companies that are very difficult to do from outside the company.
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